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22 U.S.C. § 286qLimitation on allocations to the United States

submitted 58 years ago by Pub. L. 90-349 to r/title-22-FOREIGN-RELATIONS-AND-INTERCOURSE · 516 words · no verdicts yet

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Without a new law from Congress, no one can vote, on behalf of the U.S., to let the U.S. receive more Special Drawing Rights in one period than its IMF quota allows. Before any SDR allocation vote, the Treasury Secretary must consult key congressional committees at least 90 days ahead. The U.S. also cannot trade SDRs with a country the Secretary of State finds has committed genocide or repeatedly backed terrorism, unless Congress authorizes it or the President waives the ban for national-interest reasons.

(a) Unless Congress passes a law authorizing it, neither the President nor anyone else can vote, on behalf of the United States, to allocate Special Drawing Rights under Article XVIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Fund's Articles of Agreement, in a way that gives the United States more SDRs in that period than the U.S. quota at the Fund allows (as set under the Bretton Woods Agreements Act). (b)(1) Neither the President nor anyone else can vote, on the United States' behalf, to allocate Special Drawing Rights under Article XVIII, sections 2 and 3, without the Secretary of the Treasury first consulting — at least 90 days before the vote — the Chairman and ranking minority members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, and their relevant subcommittees. (2) These consultations must explain how the proposed allocation is consistent with the Fund's Articles of Agreement — in particular, the requirement that the Fund, in all its SDR-allocation decisions, must "seek to meet the long-term global need... to supplement existing reserve assets" in a way that promotes its purposes and avoids both economic stagnation/deflation and excess demand/inflation worldwide. (3) Unless Congress passes a law authorizing it, neither the President nor anyone else can, on the United States' behalf, voluntarily exchange Special Drawing Rights held by a member country if the Secretary of State has found that country's government either: (A) committed genocide at any point in the year before the transaction; or (B) repeatedly supported international terrorism. (4) The Secretary of the Treasury must direct the U.S. Executive Director at each international financial institution to use the U.S. voice and vote to: (A) oppose giving financial assistance to any government the Secretary of State has flagged under paragraph (3); and (B) try to make sure other member countries don't make voluntary SDR exchanges with such a government either. (5) Waiver. The President may waive paragraphs (3) and (4) case by case, but only by reporting to the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the waiver serves the U.S. national interest, with a detailed explanation why.
the actual law source: uscode.house.gov ↗public domain
(a)

Unless Congress by law authorizes such action, neither the President nor any person or agency shall on behalf of the United States vote to allocate in each basic period Special Drawing Rights under article XVIII, sections 2 and 3, of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund so that allocations to the United States in that period exceed an amount equal to the United States quota in the Fund as authorized under the Bretton Woods Agreements Act [22 U.S.C. 286 et seq.].

(b)
(1)

Neither the President nor any person or agency shall on behalf of the United States vote to allocate Special Drawing Rights under article XVIII, sections 2 and 3, of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund without consultations by the Secretary of the Treasury at least 90 days prior to any such vote, with the Chairman and ranking minority members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the appropriate subcommittees thereof.

(2)

Such consultations shall include an explanation of the consistency of such proposal to allocate with the requirements of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, in particular the requirement that in all its decisions with respect to allocation of Special Drawing Rights, the Fund shall “seek to meet the long-term global need, as and when it arises, to supplement existing reserve assets in such manner as will promote the attainment of its purposes and will avoid economic stagnation and deflation as well as excess demand and inflation in the world”.

(3)

Unless Congress by law authorizes such action, neither the President nor any person or agency shall on behalf of the United States engage in any voluntary transaction involving the exchange of Special Drawing Rights that are held by a member country of the Fund, if the Secretary of State has found that the government of the member country—

(A)

has committed genocide at any time during the 1-year period ending with the date of the transaction; or

(B)

has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(4)

The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution (as defined in section 262r(c)(2) of this title) to use the voice and vote of the United States to—

(A)

oppose the provision of financial assistance to any government with respect to which the Secretary of State has made a finding described in paragraph (3); and

(B)

seek to ensure that the member countries of the institution do not engage in voluntary transactions involving the exchange of Special Drawing Rights held by such a government.

(5)Waiver.—

The President may waive paragraphs (3) and (4) on a case-by-case basis if the President reports to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the waiver is in the national interest of the United States, and includes a detailed explanation of the reasons therefor.

Source credit: (Pub. L. 90–349, § 6, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 189; Pub. L. 91–599, ch. 1, § 2, Dec. 30, 1970, 84 Stat. 1657; Pub. L. 94–564, § 5(3), Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2661; Pub. L. 98–181, title I [title VIII, § 803], Nov. 30, 1983, 97 Stat. 1270; Pub. L. 118–47, div. F, title VII, § 7071(a), (b), Mar. 23, 2024, 138 Stat. 850, 851.)

history & why it existsrecord from the source credit
  • 1968Enacted · Pub. L. 90-349 · 82 Stat. 189
  • 1970Amended · Pub. L. 91-599 · 84 Stat. 1657
  • 1976Amended · Pub. L. 94-564 · 90 Stat. 2661
  • 1983Amended · Pub. L. 98-181 · 97 Stat. 1270
  • 2024Amended · Pub. L. 118-47 · 138 Stat. 850, 851

A history note hasn’t been published yet. The record shows enactment by Pub. L. 90-349 on 1968-06-19.

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