18 U.S.C. § 3236 — Murder or manslaughter

This law sets the place, or venue, for prosecuting murder and manslaughter cases. It applies to every case of murder or manslaughter under this title. The general rule is simple: the crime is treated as committed where the fatal act happened. That is true no matter where the victim later dies. The law names three ways a killing can happen. First, if the victim was injured, the crime is deemed committed where that injury was inflicted. Second, if poison caused the death, the crime is deemed committed where the poison was administered. Third, if some other means caused the death, the crime is deemed committed where that means was used. In every case, the place where the death actually occurs does not matter. Only the place where the deadly act took place decides where the case can be tried.

The record. According to the source credit, this section was enacted on June 25, 1948, as part of chapter 645, appearing at 62 Stat. 826. The source credit shows no subsequent amendments, indicating the text has remained unchanged since its original enactment. Historical context. The 1948 enactment date and chapter number place this section within the broad recodification of federal criminal law that occurred that year, when Congress reorganized and restated Title 18 of the United States Code. Enactments from this period are generally understood to have consolidated and clarified existing federal criminal statutes and venue rules rather than to have created wholly new substantive law; many such provisions carried forward principles from earlier federal statutes governing the place of trial for offenses spanning multiple jurisdictions. The specific rule stated here—that a homicide is deemed to have occurred where the injurious act took place, regardless of where death actually occurred—addresses a recurring practical problem in criminal venue: an assailant may inflict harm in one place while the victim dies elsewhere, potentially in another judicial district. Fixing the place of the offense at the site of the injurious act, rather than the place of death, is consistent with longstanding common-law and statutory approaches to this venue problem. Beyond this general legislative and historical backdrop, the record does not establish the specific reasons Congress included this particular provision in the 1948 recodification, and no further detail should be inferred.