10 U.S.C. § 391 — Reporting on cyber incidents with respect to networks and information systems of operationally critical contractors and certain other contractors
submitted 12 years ago by Pub. L. 113-291 to r/title-10-ARMED-FORCES · 808 words · no verdicts yet
The Defense Department must require 'operationally critical contractors' to quickly report cyber incidents. Reports must cover the incident's effect, the method used, any malware found, and what data was compromised. The rules protect trade secrets and limit who can see the reported information. Contractors who follow the rules are generally shielded from lawsuits over the incident. That shield doesn't cover willful misconduct.
(a) Designation of Department Component to Receive Reports: The Secretary of Defense must name a part of the Department of Defense to receive cyber-incident reports — both from contractors, under this section and section 393, and from other government bodies.
(b) Procedures for Reporting Cyber Incidents: The Secretary must set up procedures requiring an "operationally critical contractor" to report, in a timely way, each cyber incident on its network or information systems to the component named under subsection (a).
(c) Procedure Requirements: (1) Designation and notification: The procedures must include a way to designate operationally critical contractors and to notify a contractor once it has been designated. (2) Rapid reporting: The procedures must require each operationally critical contractor to quickly report each cyber incident to the designated Department component. Every report must include: (A) the contractor's assessment of how the incident affects its ability to meet its contract requirements with the Department; (B) the technique or method used in the incident; (C) a sample of any malicious software the contractor found and isolated; and (D) a summary of what information was compromised. (3) Department assistance and access to equipment and information by department personnel: The procedures must let Department personnel help contractors detect and stop intrusions when asked, and must limit what equipment or information a contractor has to give Department staff to only what's needed to find out whether Department-related information was stolen from the contractor's systems, and if so, what was taken. (4) Protection of trade secrets and other information: The procedures must reasonably protect trade secrets, financial and commercial information, and information that could identify a specific person. (5) Dissemination of information: The procedures must limit who receives information gathered this way to: (A) entities whose mission the information may affect; (B) entities that might help diagnose, detect, or fix cyber incidents; (C) entities doing counterintelligence or law enforcement investigations; or (D) entities needing it for national security, including cyber situational awareness and defense.
(d) Protection From Liability of Operationally Critical Contractors: (1) No lawsuit may proceed against an operationally critical contractor — and any such suit must be promptly dismissed — for complying with this section and with the related cyber-incident-reporting requirements in its Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement contract clause, as long as the contractor followed the procedures set under subsection (b). (2)(A) This protection does not require dismissing a suit against a contractor that engaged in "willful misconduct" while following those procedures, and it doesn't limit any other legal defenses the contractor might otherwise have. (B) In a suit claiming the shield doesn't apply because of willful misconduct, the person suing must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the contractor's willful misconduct directly caused their injury. (C) "Willful misconduct" means an act or failure to act that is done on purpose to achieve a wrongful goal, done knowingly without any legal or factual justification, and done while disregarding a known, obvious risk that's so serious it's highly likely harm will outweigh any benefit.
(e) Definitions: (1) "Cyber incident" means actions using computer networks that actually or potentially harm an information system or the information on it. (2) "Operationally critical contractor" means a contractor the Secretary designates as a critical supplier of airlift, sealift, intermodal transportation, or logistics support essential to mobilizing, deploying, or sustaining the Armed Forces* in a contingency operation*.
The Secretary of Defense shall designate a component of the Department of Defense to receive reports of cyber incidents from contractors in accordance with this section and section 393 of this title or from other governmental entities.
The Secretary of Defense shall establish procedures that require an operationally critical contractor to report in a timely manner to component designated under subsection (a) each time a cyber incident occurs with respect to a network or information system of such operationally critical contractor.
The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall include a process for—
designating operationally critical contractors; and
notifying a contractor that it has been designated as an operationally critical contractor.
The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall require each operationally critical contractor to rapidly report to the component of the Department designated pursuant to subsection (d)(2)(A) on each cyber incident with respect to any network or information systems of such contractor. Each such report shall include the following:
An assessment by the contractor of the effect of the cyber incident on the ability of the contractor to meet the contractual requirements of the Department.
The technique or method used in such cyber incident.
A sample of any malicious software, if discovered and isolated by the contractor, involved in such cyber incident.
A summary of information compromised by such cyber incident.
The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall—
include mechanisms for Department personnel to, if requested, assist operationally critical contractors in detecting and mitigating penetrations; and
provide that an operationally critical contractor is only required to provide access to equipment or information as described in subparagraph (A) to determine whether information created by or for the Department in connection with any Department program was successfully exfiltrated from a network or information system of such contractor and, if so, what information was exfiltrated.
The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall provide for the reasonable protection of trade secrets, commercial or financial information, and information that can be used to identify a specific person.
The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall limit the dissemination of information obtained or derived through the procedures to entities—
with missions that may be affected by such information;
that may be called upon to assist in the diagnosis, detection, or mitigation of cyber incidents;
that conduct counterintelligence or law enforcement investigations; or
for national security purposes, including cyber situational awareness and defense purposes.
No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any operationally critical contractor, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for compliance with this section and contract requirements established pursuant to Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clause 252.204-7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting, that is conducted in accordance with procedures established pursuant to subsection (b) and such contract requirements.
Nothing in this section shall be construed—
to require dismissal of a cause of action against an operationally critical contractor that has engaged in willful misconduct in the course of complying with the procedures established pursuant to subsection (b); or
to undermine or limit the availability of otherwise applicable common law or statutory defenses.
In any action claiming that paragraph (1) does not apply due to willful misconduct described in subparagraph (A), the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the willful misconduct by each operationally critical contractor subject to such claim and that such willful misconduct proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.
In this subsection, the term “willful misconduct” means an act or omission that is taken—
intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose;
knowingly without legal or factual justification; and
in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit.
In this section:
The term “cyber incident” means actions taken through the use of computer networks that result in an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system or the information residing therein.
The term “operationally critical contractor” means a contractor designated by the Secretary for purposes of this section as a critical source of supply for airlift, sealift, intermodal transportation services, or logistical support that is essential to the mobilization, deployment, or sustainment of the Armed Forces* in a contingency operation*.
Source credit: (Added Pub. L. 113–291, div. A, title XVI, § 1632(a), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3639; amended Pub. L. 114–92, div. A, title XVI, § 1641(b), (c)(1), Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 1115, 1116; Pub. L. 116–283, div. A, title XVII, § 1704, Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 4082.)
- 2014Enacted · Pub. L. 113-291 · 128 Stat. 3639
- 2015Amended · Pub. L. 114-92 · 129 Stat. 1115, 1116
- 2021Amended · Pub. L. 116-283 · 134 Stat. 4082
A history note hasn’t been published yet. The record shows enactment by Pub. L. 113-291 on 2014-12-19.
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