10 U.S.C. § 430e — Vendor support to clandestine activities
submitted 1 year ago by Pub. L. 119-60 to r/title-10-ARMED-FORCES · 400 words · no verdicts yet
The Secretary of Defense must build and run a secure central system to track, deconflict, and assess risk for all commercial vendor support to clandestine activities. The Secretary can exclude a vendor's information for security reasons but must notify Congress within 7 days. The system must be used every time a vendor supports a clandestine activity.
(a) Oversight, Deconfliction, and Risk Assessment Capability. The Secretary of Defense must build, keep up to date, and use one secure, central technical system. Its job is to help the Department of Defense oversee, "deconflict" (make sure efforts don't collide or duplicate), and assess the risk of all commercial vendor support to clandestine activities — see (d) below for what "clandestine activity" means. The system must:
(1) let the Department review past, current, and planned clandestine activities that use support from commercial vendors, including their subcontractors; and
(2) use the minimum information needed to (A) spot potential conflicts between different clandestine activities, (B) flag when more coordination is needed, and (C) assess the combined risk from all vendor-supported clandestine activities.
(b) Exclusions. If the Secretary decides that information about a particular commercial vendor should be kept out of the central system — because of operational needs, counterintelligence concerns, or other national security reasons — the Secretary may exclude it. Within 7 days of making that decision, the Secretary must tell Congress: the congressional defense committees*, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. That notice must break down, by which part of the Department of Defense the vendor supports: (A) how many vendors were excluded, (B) what kinds of activities those vendors support, and (C) why the Secretary excluded them.
(c) Deconfliction. Whenever a commercial vendor is expected to support a clandestine activity, the Secretary must make sure the central system is actually used to (1) deconflict that vendor's use across different clandestine activities, and (2) assess the operational risk and counterintelligence exposure that comes from using that vendor.
(d) Clandestine Activity Defined. In this section, "clandestine activity" means any activity where the plan is that the U.S. government's role will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.
The Secretary of Defense shall establish, maintain, continuously update, and use a secure, centralized technical capability to facilitate oversight, deconfliction, and risk assessments of all commercial vendor support to the Department of Defense for clandestine activities. Such capability shall—
enable the Department of Defense to perform oversight, deconfliction, and risk assessments of past, ongoing, or planned clandestine activity involving support from commercial vendors, including all subcontractors; and
include use of the minimum information required to—
identify potential conflicts between clandestine activities;
identify the need for additional coordination with respect to clandestine activities; and
conduct aggregate risk assessments of clandestine activities involving support from commercial vendors; and 1
Notwithstanding subsection (a), if the Secretary of Defense determines that information concerning a commercial vendor should not be used by the centralized technical capability required by subsection (a) due to operational, counterintelligence, or other national security concerns, the Secretary may exclude such information from use by such centralized technical capability.
Not later than 7 days after making a determination under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees*, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives notice of the determination that includes the following information disaggregated by the element of the Department of Defense with respect to which such commercial vendor provides support:
The number of commercial vendors with respect to which the Secretary made the determination under paragraph (1).
A description of the types of activities supported by such commercial vendors.
The rationale for excluding the information concerning such commercial vendors from such capability.
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure the centralized technical capability required by subsection (a) is used in each case where a commercial vendor is expected to provide support to a clandestine activity to—
deconflict the use of commercial vendors in support of clandestine activities of the Department of Defense; and
assess operational risk and counterintelligence exposure attributable to the use of commercial vendors in support of clandestine activities of the Department of Defense.
In this section, the term “clandestine activity” means any activity where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.
Source credit: (Added Pub. L. 119–60, div. A, title XVI, § 1621(a), Dec. 18, 2025, 139 Stat. 1180.)
- 2025Enacted · Pub. L. 119-60 · 139 Stat. 1180
A history note hasn’t been published yet. The record shows enactment by Pub. L. 119-60 on 2025-12-18.
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