10 U.S.C. § 4891 — Improved national defense control of technology diversions overseas

submitted 34 years ago by Pub. L. 102-484 to r/title-10-ARMED-FORCES · 241 words · no verdicts yet

in plain englishAI-generated · not legal advice

Defense and Energy must collect information about contractors controlled by foreign persons. Defense must also require a technology-diversion risk assessment for certain proposed corporate actions.

(a) Defense and Energy must each maintain a database listing and describing their contractors controlled by foreign persons. For contracts over $10 million awarded in a year, it must contain information for 1988 and later years. (b) If the Defense Secretary is the President’s designee under 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a) and finds a proposed or pending merger, acquisition, or takeover may involve defense-critical technology or the defense industrial and technology base, the Secretary must require an appropriate listed entity to assess diversion risk. The entities are the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Foreign Technology Science Center, Naval Maritime Intelligence Center, and Air Force Foreign Aerospace Science and Technology Center.

the actual law source: uscode.house.gov ↗public domain

(a)Collection of Information on Foreign-Controlled Contractors.—

The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall each collect and maintain a data base containing a list of, and other pertinent information on, all contractors with the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, respectively, that are controlled by foreign persons. The data base shall contain information on such contractors for 1988 and thereafter in all cases where they are awarded contracts exceeding $10,000,000 in any single year by the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy.

(b)Technology Risk Assessment Requirement.—

(1)

If the Secretary of Defense is acting as a designee of the President under section 721(a) 1 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)) and if the Secretary determines that a proposed or pending merger, acquisition, or takeover may involve a firm engaged in the development of a defense critical technology or is otherwise important to the defense industrial and technology base, then the Secretary shall require the appropriate entity or entities from the list set forth in paragraph (2) to conduct an assessment of the risk of diversion of defense critical technology posed by such proposed or pending action.

(2)

The entities referred to in paragraph (1) are the following:

(A)

The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(B)

The Army Foreign Technology Science Center.

(C)

The Naval Maritime Intelligence Center.

(D)

The Air Force Foreign Aerospace Science and Technology Center.

Source credit: (Added Pub. L. 102–484, div. A, title VIII, § 838(a), Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2465, § 2537; amended Pub. L. 103–35, title II, § 201(d)(5), (h)(2), May 31, 1993, 107 Stat. 99, 100; Pub. L. 107–314, div. A, title X, § 1041(a)(16), Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2645; Pub. L. 114–328, div. A, title X, § 1081(b)(4)(B), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2419; Pub. L. 115–91, div. A, title X, § 1051(a)(19), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1561; renumbered § 4891, Pub. L. 116–283, div. A, title XVIII, § 1870(f)(2), Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 4287.)

history & why it existsrecord from the source credit

1992Enacted · Pub. L. 102-484 · 106 Stat. 2465
1993Amended · Pub. L. 103-35 · 107 Stat. 99, 100
2002Amended · Pub. L. 107-314 · 116 Stat. 2645
2016Amended · Pub. L. 114-328 · 130 Stat. 2419
2017Amended · Pub. L. 115-91 · 131 Stat. 1561
2021Amended · Pub. L. 116-283 · 134 Stat. 4287

A history note hasn’t been published yet. The record shows enactment by Pub. L. 102-484 on 1992-10-23.

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