10 U.S.C. § 494 — Nuclear force reductions

(a) Implementation of New START Treaty. (1) Sense of Congress. Congress states that—(A) the United States is committed to a safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent; (B) the United States should maintain and support an enduring stockpile-stewardship program and modernize nuclear-weapons production capabilities to ensure the deterrent’s safety, security, reliability, and credibility and to hedge against possible international or technical problems; (C) the United States should maintain nuclear-weapons laboratories and plants and preserve the related intellectual infrastructure, abilities, and skills; and (D) the United States should provide resources for these goals, starting with the levels in the President’s 10-year plan submitted under section 1251 of the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. (2) Insufficient funding. (A) Report. During each year the New START Treaty is in force, if the President finds that an appropriations law does not meet the resource levels in the November 2010 update to that plan, or finds that carrying out the plan requires more resources than estimated, the President must, within 60 days, send the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing—(i) a plan to address the shortfall; (ii) if more resources are needed, the required funding and the stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, asset, program, operation, activity, construction, or project needing more money; (iii) effects of the shortfall on the safety, security, reliability, or credibility of United States nuclear forces; (iv) whether and why remaining in the treaty is still in the United States’ national interest; and (v) why the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review modernization timelines no longer apply. (B) If the President sends this report, the President must notify the committees at least 60 days before reducing deployed United States nuclear warheads. (C) That notice is not required for reductions needed to ensure the stockpile and strategic delivery systems’ safety, security, reliability, and credibility, including surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance, or for warheads already retired or awaiting dismantlement on the report date. (D) “Appropriate congressional committees” means the congressional defense committees, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. “New START Treaty” means the treaty between the United States and Russia on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms, signed April 8, 2010, and effective February 5, 2011. (b) Annual Report on the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile. (1) Congress states that sustained investment in the nuclear stockpile and security complex is needed for a safe, secure, reliable, and credible deterrent, and that such investment could allow future reductions in the hedge stockpile. (2) By March 1 each year, the Secretary of Defense must send the congressional defense committees a report containing—(A) an accounting, as of the previous fiscal year’s end, of every active and inactive, deployed and nondeployed stockpile weapon, including each category and readiness state; and (B) planned force levels for each nuclear-weapons category during the future-years defense program for the fiscal year after the report year. (c) Net Assessment Required for Certain Reduction Proposals. (1) If, in a year after December 31, 2021, the President makes a proposal under paragraph (2), the Commander of United States Strategic Command must assess the current and proposed nuclear forces of the United States and other nuclear-armed countries to determine whether United States forces are expected to meet United States objectives for deterrence, extended deterrence, assuring allies, and defense. The Secretary of Defense must send that assessment unchanged, with any explanatory views, to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. The National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator must send those committees a report describing the current ability of United States nuclear-weapons infrastructure to respond to a strategic development or technical problem in the stockpile. (2) A proposal is a proposal to reduce active or inactive United States stockpiles below their December 31, 2021 level. It does not include routine stockpile-stewardship reductions, including surveillance, logistics, or maintenance, or weapons retired or awaiting dismantlement on that date. (3) This requirement ends February 1, 2025. (d) Prevention of Asymmetry in Reductions. (1) In a year when the President recommends reducing active and inactive United States stockpiles by more than a de minimis reduction, the President must certify in writing to the congressional defense committees whether the reduction would make the United States stockpile smaller than the intelligence community’s high-confidence assessment of Russia’s active and inactive stockpiles. (2) If the President certifies that it would, the President must send the committees, at least 60 days before carrying out the reduction, an unchanged Strategic Command commander report stating whether the reduction would create strategic imbalance or weaken United States deterrence or extended deterrence compared with Russia’s total nuclear weapons. (3) This notice is not required for reductions needed for stockpile or strategic-delivery-system safety, security, reliability, and credibility, including surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and maintenance, or for warheads retired or awaiting dismantlement on the certification date. (4) When sending the commander’s report, the President may also send a report about whether the recommended reductions would affect United States deterrence or extended-deterrence capabilities.