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18 U.S.C. § 1501Assault on process server

submitted 78 years ago by ch. 645 to r/title-18-CRIMES-AND-CRIMINAL-PROCEDURE · 111 words · no verdicts yet

in plain englishAI-generated · not legal advice

It is a crime to knowingly obstruct or resist someone serving a U.S. court's legal papers. It is also a crime to assault or wound that server, knowing who they are. The penalty is a fine, up to one year in prison, or both, unless another law says otherwise.

This section punishes two kinds of behavior against people serving court papers. First, it is a crime to knowingly and willfully obstruct, resist, or oppose a U.S. officer, or another authorized person. This applies while that person serves, or tries to serve, a legal or judicial writ or process. That writ or process must come from a U.S. court or magistrate judge. Second, it is a crime to assault, beat, or wound such an officer or authorized person. This applies while they are serving or executing a writ, rule, order, process, warrant, or other legal paper. This applies only if the attacker knew the target was an officer or someone authorized to serve papers. Unless another law sets a different penalty, the punishment for either act is a fine, up to one year in prison, or both.

facts

- Location: Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1501, under the heading "Assault on process server." - Length: The statutory text comprises 111 words. - Original Enactment: Enacted June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 769. - Amendments: Subsequently amended three times, by Pub. L. 90–578 (1968), Pub. L. 101–650 (1990), and Pub. L. 103–322 (1994). - Source Credit: The source credit contains four total legislative references spanning 1948–1994.
the actual law source: uscode.house.gov ↗public domain

Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or opposes any officer of the United States, or other person duly authorized, in serving, or attempting to serve or execute, any legal or judicial writ or process of any court of the United States, or United States magistrate judge; or

Whoever assaults, beats, or wounds any officer or other person duly authorized, knowing him to be such officer, or other person so duly authorized, in serving or executing any such writ, rule, order, process, warrant, or other legal or judicial writ or process—

Shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

Source credit: (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 769; Pub. L. 90–578, title IV, § 402(b)(2), Oct. 17, 1968, 82 Stat. 1118; Pub. L. 101–650, title III, § 321, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5117; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(F), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

history & why it existsrecord from the source credit
  • 1948Enacted · Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645 · 62 Stat. 769
  • 1968Amended · Pub. L. 90-578 · 82 Stat. 1118
  • 1990Amended · Pub. L. 101-650 · 104 Stat. 5117
  • 1994Amended · Pub. L. 103-322 · 108 Stat. 2147
The record. According to the source credit, this section was enacted on June 25, 1948, as part of chapter 645 of that year's session laws (62 Stat. 769), the general revision and codification of federal criminal law that established Title 18 in its modern form. The source credit further indicates that the section has been amended three times since enactment: by Public Law 90–578 in 1968, by Public Law 101–650 in 1990, and by Public Law 103–322 in 1994. The 1968 amendment appears tied to a broader title concerning federal magistrates, consistent with the statute's reference to United States magistrate judges. Historical context. The 1948 act that produced this section is generally understood to have been a comprehensive codification effort, consolidating and restating existing federal criminal statutes into a single organized title rather than creating wholly new substantive offenses. Provisions criminalizing obstruction of, or assault upon, officers serving federal judicial process are commonly understood to reflect a longstanding interest in protecting the integrity of court processes and the safety of those who execute them. Beyond this general understanding of the 1948 codification's purpose, the record here does not establish the specific legislative motivation behind this particular provision, and no further detail should be inferred.

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