22 U.S.C. § 2429a–2 — Enforcement of nonproliferation treaties
submitted 32 years ago by Pub. L. 103-236 to r/title-22-FOREIGN-RELATIONS-AND-INTERCOURSE · 238 words · no verdicts yet
Congress states that the President should seek a United Nations resolution imposing possible economic sanctions on non-nuclear-weapon states that violate full-scope IAEA safeguards. U.S. assistance is prohibited for a state the President finds has committed specified violations, unless the President makes the required determination and gives Congress 15 days’ advance notice.
(a) Policy. Congress expressed its view that the President should instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to strengthen the United Nations’ role in enforcing nonproliferation treaties. This should be done by obtaining a Security Council resolution stating that a non-nuclear-weapon state found by the Security Council, after consulting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to have ended, revoked, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement would face international economic sanctions. The Security Council would decide the sanctions’ scope.
(b) Prohibition. Despite any other law, the United States may not provide assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to a non-nuclear-weapon state that the President finds has ended, revoked, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguard agreement, or materially violated a bilateral U.S. nuclear-cooperation agreement made after March 10, 1978.
(c) Waiver. The President may waive subsection (b) if—
(1) the President determines that ending the assistance would seriously harm the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation goals or otherwise threaten the common defense and security; and
(2) the President reports that determination to Congress at least 15 days before assistance to that state resumes.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to enhance the role of that institution in the enforcement of nonproliferation treaties through the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution which would state that, any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the United Nations Security Council, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement would be subjected to international economic sanctions, the scope of which to be determined by the United Nations Security Council.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no United States assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.] shall be provided to any non-nuclear weapon state that is found by the President to have terminated, abrogated, or materially violated an IAEA full-scope safeguard agreement or materially violated a bilateral United States nuclear cooperation agreement entered into after March 10, 1978.
The President may waive the application of subsection (b) if—
the President determines that the termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security; and
the President reports such determination to the Congress at least 15 days in advance of any resumption of assistance to that state.
Source credit: (Pub. L. 103–236, title V, § 530, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 479.)
- 1994Enacted · Pub. L. 103-236 · 108 Stat. 479
A history note hasn’t been published yet. The record shows enactment by Pub. L. 103-236 on 1994-04-30.
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