42 U.S.C. § 2160d — Further restrictions on exports

(a) Unless subsection (b) applies, the Commission may license export of highly enriched uranium for use as fuel or a target in a nuclear research or test reactor only if it finds that (1) no lower-U-235-enriched alternative fuel or target can be used in that reactor; (2) the recipient promises to use the alternative whenever it can be used; and (3) the United States Government is actively developing such an alternative. (b)(1) Definitions. (A) \"highly enriched uranium\" means uranium with more than 20 percent U-235. (B) \"medical isotope\" includes molybdenum-99, iodine-131, xenon-133, and other radioactive materials used to produce a radiopharmaceutical for diagnosis, treatment, or research and development. (C) \"radiopharmaceutical\" means a radioactive isotope containing byproduct material combined with chemical or biological material and designed to collect temporarily in part of the body for treatment or to make a useful image for diagnosing a medical condition. (D) \"recipient country\" means Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, or the Netherlands. (b)(2) The Commission may license export, including shipment to and use by the specified intermediate and final consignees, of highly enriched uranium to a recipient country for medical-isotope production if it makes the findings in this paragraph, in addition to other chapter requirements except subsection (a). A country providing an assurance letter must have told the United States that each specified consignee must use the uranium only to make medical isotopes. The uranium may be irradiated only in a reactor in a recipient country that uses an alternative fuel or is covered by a United States agreement to convert to one when an alternative can be used. (b)(3)(A) The Commission must review whether physical-protection requirements in effect when an application is made are adequate for transportation and storage of the uranium and control of residual material after irradiation and isotope extraction. (B) If more protection is needed, including a limit on uranium per shipment, the Commission must impose it as a license condition or by another suitable method. (b)(4)(A) The Secretary must arrange for the National Academy of Sciences to study whether commercial sources not using highly enriched uranium can supply medical isotopes; current and projected domestic demand and availability; progress by the Department of Energy and others toward eliminating highly enriched uranium from reactor fuel, targets, and isotope facilities; and the possible cost difference if such systems did not use highly enriched uranium. (B) Low-enriched production is feasible if low-enriched targets have been developed and shown to work in reactors and target facilities producing significant quantities for United States needs, enough isotope is available to meet domestic needs, and the average expected total cost increase is less than 10 percent. (C) Within five years after August 8, 2005, the Secretary must report the study findings to Congress and disclose any commercial commitments to supply domestic needs without highly enriched uranium, consistently with those feasibility standards, by four years after the report. (b)(5) If the study says commercial non-highly-enriched sources are feasible but the Secretary cannot report such commitments, the Secretary must, within six years after August 8, 2005, report options for adequate domestic supplies without highly enriched uranium and within the paragraph (4)(B)(iii) cost increase. (b)(6) When non-highly-enriched commercial facilities can meet domestic needs within that cost increase without harming reliable supply, the Secretary must certify that fact to Congress. (b)(7) After that certification, the Commission must terminate by rule its review of export-license applications under this subsection. (c) Seven years after January 2, 2013, the Commission may not license export of highly enriched uranium from the United States for medical-isotope production. (d) The period may be extended by no more than six years if, no earlier than six years after January 2, 2013, the Secretary certifies to the specified House and Senate committees that the global supply of molybdenum-99 made without highly enriched uranium is insufficient for the domestic market and that exporting United States-origin highly enriched uranium is the most effective temporary way to increase that supply. (e) To permit public review and comment, the certification process under subsection (d) must be announced in the Federal Register. (f)(1) The ban in subsections (c) and (d) cannot take effect unless the Secretaries of Energy and Health and Human Services jointly certify that enough non-highly-enriched molybdenum-99 is available for United States patients and that exporting United States-origin highly enriched uranium is unnecessary to meet patient needs. (f)(2) They must make the certification within seven years after January 2, 2013. If subsection (d) extends the period, the deadline extends by the same amount. (g) After the subsection (c) restriction takes effect, a critical shortage may suspend it for no more than 12 months if the Secretary of Energy certifies to Congress that exporting United States-origin highly enriched uranium is the only effective temporary way to supply needed molybdenum-99 and Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the suspension. (h) In this section, \"alternative nuclear reactor fuel or target\" means fuel or a target enriched to less than 20 percent U-235. \"highly enriched uranium\" means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more U-235. A fuel or target \"can be used\" if the Department of Energy's Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program has qualified it and its use permits most ongoing and planned experiments and medical-isotope production without a large percentage increase in total reactor operating cost. \"medical isotope\" includes molybdenum-99, iodine-131, xenon-133, and other radioactive materials used to produce a radiopharmaceutical for diagnostic or therapeutic procedures or research and development."},{"id":54437,"citation":"42 U.S.C. § 2160e","summary":"This section requires the President to submit agreements with Iran's nuclear program to Congress, establishes review periods and limits on sanctions relief, and requires continuing reports and certifications. It also creates expedited procedures for legislation reinstating sanctions and defines key terms.","explanation":"(a)(1) Within five calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran about Iran's nuclear program, the President must send the appropriate congressional committees and leaders the agreement and all related materials and annexes; the Secretary of State's verification-assessment report; and a certification. The certification must say the agreement has suitable terms, conditions, and duration for Iran's nuclear activities and identifies sanctions the United States or another nation or entity, including the United Nations, will waive, suspend, or reduce. The President must also determine that the agreement meets United States nonproliferation goals, does not endanger the common defense and security, adequately ensures that permitted Iranian nuclear activities will not harm or unreasonably risk that defense and security, and ensures those activities will not support a nuclear-related military or explosive purpose, including research or development of an explosive device. (a)(2) The Secretary of State must prepare a report assessing how well the Secretary can verify Iran's compliance; whether the agreement's safeguards, controls, and assurances adequately prevent permitted activities from supporting such military or explosive purposes; and whether the International Atomic Energy Agency can effectively carry out the required verification, including access to suspicious sites or covert-activity allegations and enough funding, personnel, and authority. The Secretary must assume Iran could use any measure not expressly prohibited to hide violations and could change or depart from standard practices to obstruct verification. The report must be unclassified but include a classified annex, prepared with the Director of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information. (a)(3) The requirements for the report and certification in (a)(1)(B) and (C), and subsections (b) through (g), do not apply to an agreement described in subsection (h)(5) or the EU-Iran Joint Statement of April 2, 2015. But any agreement meeting the definition in (h)(1), and related materials concluded before or after May 22, 2015, is not covered by that exception. (b)(1) For 30 calendar days after the President sends the agreement, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee must, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and obtain information to review it fully. (b)(2) The period is 60 calendar days for an agreement and all required materials sent between July 10, 2015, and September 7, 2015. (b)(3) Before and during the sending period and review period, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, relieve, or otherwise limit statutory sanctions on Iran, or refrain from applying them under the agreement, except as paragraph (6) allows. (b)(4) If both Houses pass a joint resolution of disapproval, the same prohibition continues for 12 calendar days after passage. (b)(5) If both Houses pass it and the President vetoes it, the prohibition continues for 10 calendar days after the veto. (b)(6) These prohibitions do not cover a new deferral, waiver, or suspension under the Joint Plan of Action if it is consistent with law in effect on May 22, 2015, and is made at least 45 calendar days before the President sends the agreement, report, and certification. (b)(7) In the House, \"transmittal,\" \"transmitted,\" and \"transmission\" mean delivery to the Speaker. (c)(1) Congress states that its sanctions helped bring Iran to negotiations; the negotiations are important to United States and allied security and foreign policy; this section does not require a congressional vote for the agreement to begin; the section permits congressional review and possible approval, disapproval, or no action concerning statutory sanctions relief; and Congress should have an orderly chance to consider and act on a sanctions regime that only Congress can permanently change or remove. (c)(2) United States statutory sanctions relief under an agreement or the Joint Plan of Action may be taken consistently with existing law if Congress passes a joint resolution favoring the agreement during review; may not be taken if Congress passes a joint resolution opposing it during review; and may be taken consistently with existing law if no such resolution is enacted after review. (c)(3) Such relief includes waiving, suspending, reducing, relieving, or limiting sanctions on Iran, or refraining from applying them. (d)(1) The President must keep the committees and leaders fully and currently informed about every aspect of Iran's compliance. (d)(2) Within 10 calendar days after receiving credible, accurate information about a potentially significant breach or compliance incident, the President must send it to them. (d)(3) Within 30 calendar days after that submission, the President must decide whether the incident is a material breach and, if so, whether Iran cured it, and must send the decision plus, as appropriate, a report on Iran's conduct, needed cure actions, and cure status. (d)(4) Within 180 days after entering the agreement and at least every 180 days afterward, the President must report on Iran's nuclear program and compliance, including: (A) breaches or noncompliance; (B) inspector-access delays longer than one week; (C) progress resolving IAEA concerns about possible military dimensions; (D) prohibited or otherwise weapon-advancing procurement; (E) noncompliant centrifuge research or research that could greatly shorten weapon-acquisition time if deployed; (F) prohibited diversion of uranium, carbon fiber, or other material; (G) covert nuclear, weapon-related, fissile-material, research, or development activity; (H) whether Iranian financial institutions launder money or finance terrorism, naming them when applicable; (I) ballistic-missile advances, including long-range and intercontinental programs; (J) an assessment of whether Iran directly supported, financed, planned, or carried out terrorism against the United States or a United States person, the extent of Iran's terrorism support, United States actions to stop or condemn it, its effect on United States security and citizens, and all agreement-based sanctions relief and its connection to Iran's nuclear-weapons program; and (K) whether internationally recognized human-rights violations in Iran changed, increased, or decreased from the prior 180 days. (d)(5) After submission, the State, Energy, and Defense Departments must promptly provide, upon request of a committee or leader, their views on whether the agreement's safeguards and controls adequately prevent harmful or unreasonably risky permitted activity. The President must also keep them informed of every Iran nuclear initiative or negotiation, including a new or amended agreement. (d)(6) After the review period, at least every 90 calendar days the President must decide whether he can certify that Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement and related technical agreements; has not materially breached it or has cured any breach; has not taken action, including covert action, that could significantly advance its nuclear-weapons program; and that sanctions suspension is appropriate and proportionate to Iran's specific verifiable steps ending its illicit program and is vital to United States national security. If able, he must make that certification to the committees and leaders. (d)(7) Congress states that sanctions for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles remain; unresolved issues include compensation for Americans held and tortured after the 1979 Tehran embassy seizure and their families, release of Americans in Iran, Iran's human-rights abuses, and worldwide terrorism support; the President should ensure the agreement does not compromise Israel's security or its right to exist; and Congress should be able to review and, if needed, change statutory sanctions for a long-term P5+1 agreement. (e)(1) If the President fails to make the 90-day certification, or determines that Iran materially breached the agreement and has not cured it, qualifying legislation introduced within 60 calendar days is entitled to the expedited process. In the House, \"submit\" means submit to the Speaker. (e)(2) \"Qualifying legislation\" is only a bill whose title is \"A bill reinstating statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran\" and whose text reinstates sanctions imposed under the law or laws inserted in the blank, when those sanctions were relieved under an agreement submitted under section 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and prohibits United States action to release funds or assets or give further relief under that agreement. (e)(3) During the 60-day period, the House bill may be introduced by the majority or minority leader, and the Senate bill by the majority leader or designee or minority leader or designee. (e)(4) In the House, a committee that has not reported the bill within 10 legislative days is discharged. Beginning on the third legislative day after report or discharge, a motion to proceed is in order; points of order are waived, it cannot be moved after the House has disposed of the same motion for the same agreement, the previous question is ordered, it is not debatable, and reconsideration is unavailable. The bill is considered read, points of order against it and its consideration are waived, and the previous question runs to passage with two hours equally divided between its sponsor or designee and an opponent; reconsideration of passage is unavailable. (e)(5) In the Senate, the bill goes to Foreign Relations. If not reported within 10 session days, that committee is discharged and the bill goes to the proper calendar. A motion to proceed is in order at any time after report or discharge, even after an identical motion was rejected; points of order are waived, the motion is not debatable or postponable, reconsideration is unavailable, and the bill remains unfinished business until disposed of. Debate and related debatable motions and appeals last no more than 10 hours, equally divided between majority and minority leaders or designees. Further limiting debate is permitted and not debatable; amendments, postponement, proceeding to other business, and recommittal are not in order. The vote follows debate and one requested quorum call. Appeals about procedure are decided without debate. Debate on a veto message also lasts no more than 10 hours, equally divided and controlled by the leaders or designees. (e)(6) If one House receives the other House's qualifying bill before passing its own, the other bill is not referred to committee; the receiving House follows its normal procedure but votes on the other bill. If one House does not introduce a bill, the other House's bill receives the expedited process. A House companion received by the Senate after Senate passage is not debatable. This paragraph does not apply in the House to a qualifying revenue measure. (f) Subsection (e) is adopted as an exercise of each House's rulemaking power, is part of each House's rules only for the covered procedure, supersedes inconsistent rules, and recognizes each House's constitutional power to change its rules in the same way as any other rule. (g) This section does not change the President's authority to negotiate, enter, or implement executive agreements except for the specific implementation limits here; authorize new sanctions relief or nonapplication during the review period; revoke or end statutory sanctions; or authorize military force against Iran. (h) Definitions. \"Agreement\" means an agreement about Iran's nuclear program that includes or commits the United States to action, in any form and whether binding or not, including a joint comprehensive plan of action and every related annex, appendix, codicil, side agreement, implementing material, document, guidance, technical or other understanding, or related agreement entered into or implemented before or later. \"Appropriate congressional committees\" means the Senate Finance, Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Select Intelligence, and Foreign Relations Committees and the House Ways and Means, Financial Services, Permanent Select Intelligence, and Foreign Affairs Committees. \"Appropriate congressional committees and leadership\" adds the Senate majority and minority leaders and the House Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader. This section does not define \"Iranian financial institution\" or \"United States person\"; it adopts the meanings in sections 8513b(d) and 8511 of title 22. \"Joint Plan of Action\" means the plan signed at Geneva on November 24, 2013, by Iran, France, Germany, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus its related materials and agreements, including the listed 2014 technical understanding and extensions and materially identical extensions on or after May 22, 2015. \"EU-Iran Joint Statement\" means only the April 2, 2015 statement by Federica Mogherini and Javad Zarif at Lausanne. \"Material breach\" means a breach, or failure to perform a nonbinding commitment, that substantially benefits Iran's nuclear program, shortens the time Iran needs to obtain a nuclear weapon, or departs from or undermines the agreement's purpose. \"Noncompliance\" means a departure from the agreement that is not a material breach. \"P5+1 countries\" means the United States, France, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.