6 U.S.C. § 195f — EMP and GMD mitigation research and development and threat assessment, response, and recovery

(a) In general: The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and working with other relevant executive agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, and owners and operators of critical infrastructure, must, as far as practical, do research and development to reduce the harm from threats called EMP (electromagnetic pulse) and GMD (geomagnetic disturbance). (b) Scope: This research and development must include: (1) An objective scientific study evaluating the risks EMP and GMD pose to critical infrastructure. This study must be done with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and must review and compare EMP and GMD threats with the range of other threats and hazards facing the electrical grid. (2) Figuring out which critical utilities and national security assets and infrastructure are at risk from EMP and GMD. (3) Evaluating emergency planning and response technology that answers the findings and recommendations of experts, including the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack. This must include studying whether parts of the electrical grid could feasibly be quickly isolated from the main grid. (4) Analyzing available technology, including neutral current blocking devices that could protect high-voltage transmission lines, to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure to EMP and GMD. (5) Studying how well critical infrastructure could be restored and recovered under different levels of EMP and GMD damage and disruption, informed by the scientific study from paragraph (1). (6) Analyzing whether a real-time alert system is feasible to warn grid operators and other stakeholders within milliseconds of a high-altitude nuclear explosion. (c) Exemption from disclosure: (1) Section 673 of this title, and its regulations, apply to any information shared with the federal government under this section. (2) Information the federal government shares with a state, local, or tribal government under this section is exempt from disclosure under any state, local, or tribal freedom of information, open government, open meetings, open records, or sunshine law, or similar law. (d) Threat assessment, response, and recovery: (1) Roles and responsibilities. (A) Distribution of information: Starting no later than June 19, 2020, the Secretary must provide timely distribution of EMP and GMD information to federal, state, and local governments, owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and other persons the Secretary decides are appropriate, and must brief the appropriate congressional committees on how effective this distribution is. (B) Response and recovery: The Administrator of FEMA must coordinate the response to and recovery from EMP and GMD effects on critical infrastructure, working with the heads of appropriate Sector-Specific Agencies and, on matters related to the bulk power system, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. FEMA must also, to the extent practical, include EMP and extreme GMD events as a factor in preparedness scenarios and exercises. FEMA's Administrator, working with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and, for the bulk power system, the Secretary of Energy and FERC, must, by June 19, 2020, develop plans and procedures to coordinate EMP and GMD response and recovery, and by December 21, 2020, conduct a national exercise testing the nation's preparedness and response to an EMP or extreme GMD event. (C) Research and development: The Secretary, with the heads of relevant Sector-Specific Agencies, must, without duplicating existing efforts, research and better model the effects of EMP and GMD on critical infrastructure (not including Defense Department systems or Energy Department nuclear weapons systems), and must develop technology to enhance infrastructure resilience. By March 26, 2020, the Secretary must submit to the appropriate congressional committees a research and development action plan to rapidly address modeling shortfalls and technology development. (D) Emergency information system: FEMA's Administrator, working with relevant stakeholders, must maintain a network of systems, such as the integrated public alert and warning system, capable of giving the public appropriate emergency information before (if possible), during, and after an EMP or GMD event, and must brief the appropriate congressional committees on this by December 21, 2020. (E) Quadrennial risk assessments: The Secretary, with the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Commerce, and informed by intelligence-based threat assessments, must conduct an EMP and GMD risk assessment every four years. They must brief the appropriate congressional committees by March 26, 2020, and every four years after that until 2032. They must use the assessment results to better understand and improve resilience to EMP and GMD across all critical infrastructure sectors, including prioritizing the infrastructure at greatest risk. (2) Coordination. (A) Report on technological options: By December 21, 2020, and every four years after that until 2032, the Secretary, with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, other appropriate agency heads, and private-sector partners as appropriate, must report to the appropriate congressional committees on the technological options available to improve infrastructure resilience, and on gaps and opportunities for further research and development. (B) Test data: By December 20, 2020, the Secretary, with the heads of Sector-Specific Agencies, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy, must review existing test data on EMP and GMD effects on critical infrastructure and identify any gaps in that data. Within 180 days of identifying those gaps, the Secretary, working with Sector-Specific Agencies and consulting Defense and Energy, must use the National Infrastructure Protection Plan's sector partnership structure to develop a cross-sector plan to address the gaps. The agencies named in that plan must carry it out, working with the voluntary efforts of the private sector, as appropriate. (3) Definitions: "Appropriate congressional committees" means specific named Senate committees (Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Armed Services, Energy and Natural Resources, and Commerce, Science, and Transportation) and House committees (Transportation and Infrastructure, Homeland Security, Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, and Science, Space and Technology). "Prepare" and "preparedness" mean the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the ability to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats that pose the greatest risk to homeland security, including predicting and warning about EMPs and GMDs. "Sector Risk Management Agency" has the meaning given in section 650 of this title. (e) Rule of construction: Nothing in this section may be read to affect the executive branch's authority to carry out Executive Order 13865 (dated March 26, 2019, on coordinating national resilience to electromagnetic pulses), or any other authority that existed before December 20, 2019, held by any other component of the Department or any other federal department or agency — including authority given to the Sector Risk Management Agency under a named provision of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, authority under section 824o of title 16, and the independence of independent agencies. Nor does it diminish or transfer any authority the Administrator of FEMA or FEMA itself held before December 20, 2019.