10 U.S.C. § 4129 — Joint Federated Assurance Center
submitted 2 years ago by Pub. L. 118-159 to r/title-10-ARMED-FORCES · 806 words · no verdicts yet
The Joint Federated Assurance Center supports Department of Defense hardware and software assurance and supply-chain risk management. The Secretary of Defense must issue a revised charter for the Center within 180 days after this section's enactment.
(a) Establishment. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering has a Joint Federated Assurance Center, called the “Center.” (b) Purpose. The Center is a Department-wide federation of organizations and capabilities that supports the Department of Defense's assurance needs. Under policies about hardware and software assurance and supply-chain risk management, the Center must help ensure that software and hardware developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department are free from intentional and unintentional vulnerability during the development life cycle and the deployment of assured, trustworthy defense systems. (c) Governance. (1) An Executive Steering Group governs the Center. It must continually evaluate the Center's capabilities to support the Department's hardware and software assurance needs. (2) The Executive Steering Group must include one or more representatives from each organization that makes up the Center. (3) The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition* and Sustainment serve as the Executive Steering Group's co-chairpersons. (d) Duties. The Center's duties are: (1) Provide knowledge-management capabilities for hardware and software assurance for the Department. (2) Provide Department-wide visibility into strategy, use cases, procurement, investment, and other relevant activities, so that, as far as practicable, the Department can combine its purchases of assurance tools. (3) Develop and standardize policies, procedures, competencies, risk-assessment methods, and independent validation and verification testing capabilities—(A) to support the timely and cost-effective fielding of current and future technologies to the Department; (B) to ensure that enduring capability needs are sustained throughout the life cycle of Department of Defense programs and to determine the sustainment factors related to assuring future hardware and software systems; (C) to increase efficiency across Department of Defense programs through emerging assurance technologies; and (D) to use economies of scale through the coordinated acquisition and use of hardware and software assurance technologies. (4) Promote hardware and software assurance capabilities—(A) to mature assessment criteria and enable scalable deployment of commercial best practices, including by fostering and maturing evidence-based assurance for trusted defense microelectronics system needs, with emphasis on commercial security protocols that can be transferred to defense applications; (B) to scale the Center for Department-wide access by providing enough personnel to address standardization and automation of data collection and analysis; (C) to use data from commercial assurance processes to support the development of Department hardware and software that meet standards, applications, and requirements, including through comparative analysis and data modeling; (D) to seek and apply commercial best practices, where practicable, through collaboration with industry; and (E) to develop and align Department policy, investments, and activities with commercial best practices, to the extent practicable. (5) For contracts for application-specific integrated circuits designed by defense industrial base contractors, develop guidance for—(A) considering evidence-based assurance processes and techniques included in the contract data requirements list, to the extent practicable; (B) using commercial best practices, as applicable, for confidentiality, integrity, and availability; and (C) developing a library of certified third-party intellectual property for reuse, including streamlining legal mechanisms for data collection and sharing and increasing the use of automation technology to achieve efficiency. (6) Assess, create, prototype, mature, and maintain relevant assurance practices, including validating and maturing evidence-based assurance methods, for developing, procuring, and deploying hardware and software assurance tools and processes, including—(A) developing and assessing validation methods for those processes and techniques, in coordination with the developmental and operational test and evaluation community, as the Executive Steering Group determines necessary; (B) developing and assessing threat models that comprehensively describe the threats to microelectronics confidentiality, integrity, and availability across the entire supply chain and throughout the design, production, packaging, and deployment cycle, to support risk management and risk mitigation; and (C) supporting the development of guides to inform use and decision-making by program evaluators, program offices, and industry so they can meet software and hardware assurance requirements. (e) Revised charter. No later than 180 days after this section is enacted, the Secretary of Defense must issue a revised charter for the Center. The charter must state—(1) the Center's and the Executive Steering Group's roles and authorities; (2) that the Center must establish guidelines for developing improved software-code vulnerability analysis and testing tools; (3) that the Center must establish guidelines for developing improved hardware vulnerability testing and protection tools; and (4) how the Center will connect to the Department's major governance and resourcing processes to ensure that the Center's duties continue.
There is in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering a Joint Federated Assurance Center (referred to in this section as the “Center”).
The purpose of the Center shall be to serve as a joint, Department-wide federation of organizations and capabilities to support the assurance needs of the Department of Defense by ensuring, pursuant to policies related to hardware and software assurance and supply chain risk management, that the software and hardware developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department are free from intentional and unintentional vulnerability during the life-cycle of development and deployment of assured, trustworthy defense systems.
The Center shall be governed by an Executive Steering Group. The Executive Steering Group shall continually evaluate the Center’s capabilities to support the hardware and software assurance needs of the Department.
The Executive Steering Group shall be composed of one or more representatives from each of the organizations that comprise the Center.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition* and Sustainment shall serve as co-Chairpersons of the Executive Steering Group.
The duties of the Center are as follows:
Providing knowledge management capabilities for hardware and software assurance for the Department.
Providing Department-wide visibility on strategy, use cases, procurement, investment, and other relevant activities to aggregate, to the extent practicable, assurance tool purchases by the Department.
Developing and standardizing policies, procedures, competencies, risk assessment methodologies, and independent validation and verification test capabilities—
to support timely and cost-effective fielding of current and future technologies to the Department;
to ensure sustainment of enduring capability needs across the life-cycle of Department of Defense programs and determine the sustainment factors related to the assurance of future hardware and software systems;
to increase efficiencies across Department of Defense programs through the use of emerging assurance technologies; and
to leverage economies of scale through coordinated acquisition and use of hardware and software assurance technologies.
Promoting assurance capabilities for hardware and software assurance—
to mature assessment criteria and enable scalable deployment of commercial best practices, such as through the fostering and maturation of evidence-based assurance of trusted defense microelectronics system needs, with emphasis on commercial security protocols that are transferable to defense applications;
to scale the Center for Department-wide access, through the resourcing of adequate personnel to address standardization and automation of data collection and analysis;
to utilize data from commercial assurance processes to support the development of Department hardware and software that meet standards, applications, and requirements, including through comparative analysis and data modeling;
to seek and apply commercial best practices, where practicable, through industry collaboration; and
to develop and align Department policy, investments, and activities with commercial best practices, to the extent practicable.
For contracts for application-specific integrated circuits designed by defense industrial base contractors, develop guidance for—
the consideration of evidence-based assurance processes and techniques that are included in the contract data requirements list, to the extent practicable;
the use of commercial best practices, as applicable, for confidentiality, integrity and availability; and
the development of a library of certified third-party intellectual property for reuse, including streamlining legal mechanisms for data collection and sharing, and enhanced use of automation technology to achieve efficiency.
The assessment, creation, prototyping, maturation, and maintenance of relevant assurance practices, including the validation and maturation of evidence based assurance methods, for the development, procurement, and deployment of hardware and software assurance tools and processes, including—
development and assessment of validation methods for such processes and techniques, in coordination with the developmental and operational test and evaluation community, as the Executive Steering Group determines necessary;
development and assessment of threat models that comprehensively characterize the threat to microelectronics confidentiality, integrity, and availability across the entire supply chain, and the design, production, packaging, and deployment cycle to support risk management and risk mitigation; and
support development of guides to inform use and decision-making by program evaluators, program offices, and industry to meet software and hardware assurance requirements.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall issue a revised charter for the Center. The charter shall set forth—
the role and authorities of the Center and the Executive Steering Group;
the requirement of the Center to establish guidelines for the development of improved software code vulnerability analysis and testing tools;
the requirement of the Center to establish guidelines for the development of improved hardware vulnerability testing and protection tools; and
the manner in which the Center will connect to the Department’s major governance and resourcing processes to ensure the continuation of Center duties.
Source credit: (Added Pub. L. 118–159, div. A, title IX, § 922(a), Dec. 23, 2024, 138 Stat. 2037, § 4128; renumbered § 4129, Pub. L. 119–60, div. A, title XVII, § 1701(a)(28), Dec. 18, 2025, 139 Stat. 1209.)
- 2024Enacted · Pub. L. 118-159 · 138 Stat. 2037
- 2025Amended · Pub. L. 119-60 · 139 Stat. 1209
A history note hasn’t been published yet. The record shows enactment by Pub. L. 118-159 on 2024-12-23.
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